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by Scott Rawlings and Lloyd Snyder
and Harm to Third Parties: A Debate Based
Zimmerman
Introduction
This discussion poses the question: should
an attorney ever provide information to an
opposing party to prevent that party from
suffering great harm if the information
will have an adverse effect on the
attorney's own client? The case that sets
the stage for this discussion is Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, 243 Minn. 346 (1962). In
Spaulding, the plaintiff, a minor involved in
an automobile accident, settled a personal
injury suit for a relatively small amount.
Although neither the plaintiff nor his
attorney were aware, the defendants' coun-
sel knew that the accident resulted in an
aortic aneurysm, a condition that could
have lead to death at any time had the
injured artery burst. Defense counsel nei-
ther talked to nor advised their clients
about the option to disclose the informa-
tion to the plaintiff. Two years later, when
the plaintiff discovered his condition, the
trial court set aside the settlement.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.
The court emphasized that defense coun-
sel had acted in good faith in not disclos-
ing the information prior to settlement
and stated that counsel had no duty to dis-
close. The basis for vacating the prior
order was that the attorneys should have
informed the trial judge about the minor's
condition when seeking court approval of
the settlement. The attorneys had a duty
to be forthcoming to the court, if not to
the plaintiff Under the court's rationale,
the attorneys would have had no duty to
Argument by Lloyd Snyder
David Spaulding spent two years bearing a
life-threatening condition because oppos-
ing counsel in his civil suit assumed that
the duties of confidentiality and zealous
representation of their clients justified
withholding this information. Many
attorneys agree with this result, and argue
that it is a necessary consequence of the
adversary system. Many of these same
attorneys complain that the public unfair-
ly criticizes lawyers for being amoral, if
not immoral. They tout our codes of pro-
fessional responsibility as proof that we
are more concerned with ethical behavior
than most other professions. I disagree.
When we first entered law school, I doubt
that many of us would have justified with-
holding information that threatened the
life or health of another person. Most of
us had some notion that we were entering
the legal profession, at least in part, for the
purpose of promoting justice. We may
have had sharply differing views about
what it meant to promote justice, but it is
difficult to believe that many would have
viewed that notion as minimizing the
financial cost to an insurance company by
concealing a deadly risk.
In the culture of the legal profession, win-
ning trumps justice. An attorney who has
prevailed in a case because the other side
was l> Iorant of sig 1cant information is
an atorney who has done a good job for
the client. Any blame Por this result rests
with the lack of diligence of opposing
counsel, with the nature of the adversary
system, with the obligation of confiden-
tiality or with the quality of the trial
judge. It is the fault of everyone but the
lawyer who had the information that made
clear that the result was unfair. Is it any
wonder that in this system, the public
holds lawyers in low regard?
Recently, the legal profession has respond-
ed to its low standing in the non-legal
community by promoting professionalism.
Among other things, professionalism has
been defined to include communicating
promptly and clearly with clients, being
courteous to others, avoiding delays and
consulting with opposing counsel on pro-
cedural matters. There is nothing wrong
with any of these ideas. But if they are
intended to overcome the public's attitude
about lawyers, they are doomed to failure.
This is so for two reasons.
First, in a system where winning trumps
justice, the pressure on counsel is to
obtain the maximum amount of infor-
mation about a matter while providing
the minimum amount of information to
opposing parties. This is not a formula
for promoting cooperation and open-
ness. Zealous representation of one's
client promotes, and may mandate, with-
holding information up to the point of
being dishonest. Frustration, anger and
stressful interaction between opposing
counsel is likely to result. Second, being
pleasant, prompt, and courteous is not
likely to improve the standing of lawyers
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whose central tenet is that achieving an
unjust result is a worthy goal if the
result is advantageous to one's client.
Other professions and callings, even
those that emphasize the obligations of
loyalty and confidentiality, do not treat
these obligations as absolute as does the
legal profession. A standard agency horn-
book, for example, states that an agent
has a duty to maintain confidences on
behalf of a principal, but is excepted
from that duty by "a statement as to pro-
posed future crimes or acts which will
harm others." A comment to the
Restatement of Agency prohibits an
agent from disclosing confidential infor-
mation obtained from a principal "except
in the superior interest of another:'
It is time for the legal profession to ask
why the law of agency has this expression
of concern about harm to others and the
law of lawyering does not. If we are
unwilling to question our excessive con-
cern for secrecy and zeal, then, at the very
least, we should stop complaining about
our low standing in the court of public
opinion. We should recognize it as a rep-
utation we have earned.
Reply by Scott Rawlings
The story is told of a young lawyer many
years ago who cabled his senior partner in
a distant city that their client's trial had
resulted in "justice being done:' Without
knowing more, the senior partner wired
back: "Appeal immediately!" Apparently,
justice wasn't what the senior partner had
in mind. He didn't think that the client's
interests were served by notions of justice.
Rather, the client wanted to win. The
client wanted his counsel to zealously
advocate his cause and achieve the end
result he wanted. After all, wasn't that
what he was paying his attorney to accom-
plish for him? Wasn't that what defense
counsel in Spaulding was paid to do?
The court in Spaulding dearly and unequiv-
ocally held that defense counsel had not
violated any ethical standard nor was
counsel in violation of any rule of civil
procedure. In short, there was no written
duty binding upon lawyers in Minnesota
that governed the disposition of the
motion to vacate the settlement. The deci-
sion to vacate the settlement, rather, was
based on principles of equity, i.e., upon the
inherent power of the court to "do the
right thing:" What is the "right thing" for
an Ohio lawyer to do if faced with an issue
of disclosure where life or death of one of
the parties may be implicated?
It may be helpful at the outset to make an
initial observation when considering that
question. A lawyer has no obligation, or
right, to impose his or her moral sense
onto client decisions, and courts have no
power to require attorneys appearing
before them to disclose information based
upon their own moral standards. Morality
is in the eye of the beholder, and should
not clothe itself in the civil law. Were it
otherwise, the application of the law
would be ecclesiastical, not civil. That is
not our system of justice. "Fairness,"
though, is a factor that is often weighed by
courts when applying equitable principles.
The trial court in Spaulding was applying
equitable principles.
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How many times have we succumbed to the pressure of
winning and presumed that we were acting in our client's
interest? A moral code would induce us to resist this
pressure, not to embrace it.
A settlement agreement, for example,
requires a court to weigh factors that
would not necessarily present themselves -
or at least not to the same degree - if the
issue arose in an adversarial evidentiary
context. When reviewing a settlement
agreement, a court is required to deter-
mine, among other things, that the agree-
ment is fair. A determination of fairness
necessarily involves an analysis of the rela-
tionship between the parties, the relative
extent of knowledge of the parties, and
whether or not the settlement is the prod-
uct of "arms-length bargaining." Whether
facts have been withheld by either party -
and the importance of any facts withheld
- is critical to a decision as to whether or
not to approve the settlement. Those kinds
of considerations are as applicable in Ohio
as they are in Minnesota. To that extent, I
believe that an Ohio court might well
reach a result similar to the Minnesota
court in Spaulding if the matter arose in the
context of a settlement agreement.
Outside the settlement context, failure to
speak when under a duty to speak can be
grounds for disciplinary action. For exam-
ple, in Cincinnati Bar Assn v. Nienaber (1997),
80 Ohio St. 3d 534, a lawyer was charged
with misconduct in the context of repre-
senting the defendant in a DUI case in the
Hamilton County Municipal Court. After
a no contest plea was entered, but before
sentencing, the court and counsel engaged
in discussion in which the judge was led to
believe, by the counsel's statements and by
his failure to disclose the pendency of
another proceeding, that the DUI charge
was the defendant's first and that there
were no other pending charges. In fact, as
the attorney knew, his client was involved
with another and pending DUI case. That
case was tried later the same day. When
asked by the judge in that second case, the
lawyer did not disclose that his client had
been convicted earlier the same day, and
led the second judge to believe that the
DUI charge was his client's first in the last
five years.
The court upheld the panel's conclusion
that the respondent knowingly made false
statements to each of the two judges in
violation of DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowing-
ly making a false statement of law or fact
in the representation of a client) and that
he also violated DR I-I02(A)(4) (engag-
ing in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and
DR I-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice). It found that the respondent
made affirmative representations to the
judges that were untrue and, by his
silence, also allowed each court to draw
unwarranted inferences.
The respondent defended his conduct by
claiming that he did not misrepresent
the facts. Rather, he argued, he was not
asked specific enough questions by the
court. Under these circumstances, the
attorney claimed, he was not required to
disclose facts known to him about the
other proceeding. Additionally, relying
on advice he received in the form of an
ABA opinion when he attended an ABA
seminar on criminal law, he claimed that
an advocate in a criminal case is not
required to disclose his client's record
unless specifically asked.
The Ohio Supreme court rejected these
defenses. It held:
"... DR 7-102(A)(5) specifically prohibits
a lawyer from making a false statement of
law or fact. In Judge Helmick's court
respondent made affirmatively false state-
ments. Moreover, by his silence, respon-
dent led both judges to a false appreciation
of the situation.
Second, Formal Op. No. 287, [the ABA
opinion], relied upon by respondent,
applies only to confidential information
obtained by the client... No client may
demand or expect of his lawyer, in the fur-
therance of his cause, disloyalty to the law
whose minister he is (Canon 32), or any
manner of fraud or chicane (Canon 15). In
this instance, the respondent's knowledge
of the pending cases did not depend upon
confidential communications from his
Client, and Formal Op. 287 does not apply.
We require complete candor with courts.
We agree with the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, which sixty years ago said, An
attorney owes his first duty to the court. He
assumed his obligations toward it before he
even had a client. His oath requires him to
be absolutely honest even though his client's
interests may seem to require a contrary
course. The [lawyer] cannot serve two mas-
ters; and the one [he has] undertaken to
serve primarily is the Court' In re Integration
of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n (1937), 133 Neb.
283, 289, 275 N.W 265, 268:'
This holding is consistent with The
Lawyer's Creed, which states that an attor-
ney "shall do honor to the search for jus-
tice" and to the professionalism standards
requiring honesty with courts, clients and
the public.
Nonetheless, a lawyer should maintain
client confidences (DR 4- 1 1 (B),(C)) and
clearly has an affirmative duty to zealously
represent his or her client (DR 7-
IOI(A)(1-3)). As EC 7-19 states:
"An adversary presentation counters the
natural human tendency to judge too
swiftly ... the advocate, by his zealous pre-
sentation of facts and law, enables the
Tribunal to come to the hearing with an
Cleveand Ba
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open and neutral mind and to render
impartial judgment..."
The adversarial system is designed to pro-
mote justice, not counter or trump it, as
EC 7-19 recognizes. The ideals that are
part of our professionalism standards
encourage cooperation, courtesy, and can-
dor within the adversarial system as it
exists, and impliedly endorse that system
by their approach to the aspirational ideals
toward which attorneys should strive.
Therefore, in my view, the proper course
in light of a decision such as Spaulding is
not difficult to chart. No canon of ethics,
rule of civil procedure or principle of law
requires a lawyer to volunteer information
during the discovery process. Rather, the
lawyer's obligation is not to conceal data
or information or otherwise "hide the
ball" Cincinnati Bar Assn v. Marsick (1998),
81 Ohio St. 3d 551. However, it is nor
appropriate behavior to remain silent
when under a duty to speak (Nienaber
supra) and a duty of full disclosure is
attendant upon the presentation to a
court of a settlement agreement because
the court, sitting as an equity tribunal, is
required to judge the fairness of the settle-
ment document. Fairness or justice,
though, does not mandate a duty to volun-
teer client data or information in the dis-
covery process not sought by the adversary,
regardless of the attorney's sense of moral
duty. The adversarial process is still the
foundation of our civil justice system.
Rebuttal by Lloyd Snyder
I have no quarrel with Mr. Rawling's
description of the professional responsibil-
ity obligations that apply in a case like
Spaulding. He may have overstated the likeli-
hood that a court in Ohio would set aside
the settlement, but that is a quibble. Mr.
Spaulding was 20 years old at the time of
the accident. Were his case to arise in Ohio,
he would be considered an adult, and the
basis for setting aside the settlement would
not exist.
My quarrel is with the immorality of a code
that fosters the pressure to win at any cost.
Attorneys are under enormous pressure to
win, as the legal system defines winning. In
a personal injury case, that means to resist a
determination of liability and to minimize
the damages. We do not need ethical codes
to reinforce that pressure.
Succumbing to that pressure, Mr.
Zimmerman's attorney assumed that his
client would want him to fight for the best
possible outcome. The attorney did not
even go to his client and raise the option of
warning David Spaulding that he had a life-
threatening medical condition, knowing
that the disclosure would increase the cost
of settlement. How many of us have made
similar assumptions when representing what
we defined as the interests of our clients?
How many times have we succumbed to the
pressure of winning and presumed that we
were acting in our client's interest? A moral
code would induce us to resist this pressure,
not to embrace it.
Scott Rawling and Lloyd Snyder are members of the
CBA's Ethics and Professionalism Committee
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